JOHANSON, C.J.
¶ 1 Earl Vernon, on behalf of his brother Henry David Vernon's estate, appeals the superior court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Aacres Allvest, LLC, Aacres Landing, Inc., Aacres WA, LLC, and Aalan Holdings, Inc. (Aacres). Earl
¶ 2 We hold that (1) the superior court properly dismissed Earl's noneconomic damages claim under the wrongful death statute because he lacks standing as a statutory beneficiary and we cannot recognize a wrongful death common law cause of action which conflicts with the existing statutory framework, (2) the superior court erred in dismissing Earl's economic damages claim because these damages are available under the general survival statute notwithstanding the absence of qualifying statutory beneficiaries, (3) Earl's claim that the wrongful death statute is unconstitutional fails because the statute does not create a cause of action for deceased persons, and (4) Earl failed to preserve the claim that David should be considered a minor for the purposes of the wrongful death statute. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
¶ 3 David was born severely disabled. Because of his disabilities, David was completely dependent on others for his health and personal care needs. In 2009, David lived in a home under the care and supervision of Aacres. In late July, western Washington experienced a record-breaking heat wave. On the morning of July 29, Aacres staff member Francis Muraya found David lying unresponsive on his bedroom floor. Emergency personnel transported David to the hospital where he was pronounced dead. The cause of David's death was "exogenous
¶ 4 Earl, David's legal guardian, filed suit against Aacres under the "Abuse of Vulnerable Adults Act" (AVAA).
¶ 5 In response to Aacres' motion for summary judgment, Earl argued that damages for David's pain and suffering and for funeral expenses should be available under the wrongful death statute and the general survival statute.
¶ 6 We review summary judgment orders de novo, performing the same inquiry as the superior court. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853, 860, 93 P.3d 108 (2004). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c); Vallandigham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 154 Wn.2d 16, 26, 109 P.3d 805 (2005).
¶ 7 When reviewing a summary judgment, we consider all facts and reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Vallandigham, 154 Wash.2d at 26, 109 P.3d 805; Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., 131 Wn.2d 171, 182, 930 P.2d 307 (1997). Moreover, we consider solely the issues and evidence the parties called to the trial court's attention on the motion for summary judgment. RAP 9.12. But we will consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal if the claimed error is a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. RAP 2.5(a)(3).
¶ 8 Earl argues that despite his apparent lack of standing under the wrongful death statute, the superior court nonetheless erred in dismissing his noneconomic damages claims on summary judgment because we should recognize a common law cause of action to allow the estate to recover for David's wrongful death.
¶ 9 Washington's wrongful death statutes create a right of action to recover damages when a person's death is caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another. RCW 4.20.010. But the statutory framework also places limitations on who may bring such an action. RCW 4.20.020. RCW 4.20.020 provides in part,
Accordingly, the legislature has created a two-tier system of beneficiaries for purposes of a wrongful death action. Spouses and children of the decedent are the "first tier" beneficiaries while the decedent's parents and siblings constitute "second tier" beneficiaries. Philippides v. Bernard, 151 Wn.2d 376, 385, 88 P.3d 939 (2004). Second tier beneficiaries are entitled to recover for the decedent's wrongful death only if there are no first tier beneficiaries and if the second tier beneficiary can demonstrate that he or she was dependent upon the deceased for support. RCW 4.20.020; Philippides, 151 Wash.2d at 386, 88 P.3d 939.
¶ 10 Here, Earl admits that he was not dependent on David. Earl further admits that David was not survived by anyone who could satisfy the criteria to recover under the wrongful death statute as a designated beneficiary. Therefore, the superior court did not err in granting summary judgment in Aacres' favor because Earl lacked standing under the wrongful death statute. RCW 4.20.020.
¶ 11 Nevertheless, Earl argues that Washington courts have labored under a historical misconception that wrongful death claims never existed at common law. Earl argues that several other jurisdictions have held that their wrongful death statutes do not necessarily preclude a common law wrongful death claim. He supports his position with language from Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., in which our Supreme Court said, "When justice requires, this court does not hesitate to expand the common law and recognize a cause of action." 103 Wn.2d 131, 136, 691 P.2d 190 (1984).
¶ 12 But Earl ignores the fact that our Supreme Court has rejected an identical argument regarding a different but rather similar statute. In Philippides, the court was asked to interpret RCW 4.24.010, which governs actions for injury or death of children and which also contains a requirement that parents who bring an action on behalf of an adult child show that they are dependent on that child for support. 151 Wash.2d at 387, 88 P.3d 939. The Philippides court was asked to adopt a common law loss of consortium cause of action on behalf of parents of adult children injured or killed by a negligent defendant. 151 Wash.2d at 388, 88 P.3d 939. The Supreme Court considered the same language from Ueland that Earl cites here and noted that while it does not hesitate to expand the common law, the case before it was governed entirely by statute whereas the Ueland court was asked to expand allowable damages within an existing common law framework. Philippides, 151 Wash.2d at 390, 88 P.3d 939. The Supreme Court concluded that adopting a common law cause of action would create a direct conflict with the existing statutory scheme. Philippides, 151 Wash.2d at 390, 88 P.3d 939.
¶ 13 The Philippides court stated further,
151 Wash.2d at 390, 88 P.3d 939. Accordingly, we hold that we cannot recognize a common law wrongful death cause of action because doing so would conflict with the existing statutory framework and it is not the function of courts to modify legislative enactments.
¶ 14 Earl next contends that David's estate should be able to recover economic damages under the general survival statute, RCW 4.20.046(1), despite the lack of beneficiaries under RCW 4.20.020. Aacres responds that the general survival statute only allows recovery on behalf of the same beneficiaries enumerated in the wrongful death statute. We agree with Earl and hold that the superior court erred in failing to award funeral expenses to Earl because, contrary to Aacres' assertion, David's estate may recover economic damages under the general survival statute.
¶ 15 The general survival statute preserves all causes of action that a decedent could have brought had he or she survived. Otani ex rel. Shigaki v. Broudy, 151 Wn.2d 750, 755-56, 92 P.3d 192 (2004). The purpose of awarding damages under the survival statute is to remedy the common law anomaly that allowed tort victims to sue if they survived, but barred their claims if they died. Otani, 151 Wash.2d at 755, 92 P.3d 192. The general survival statute provides in part,
RCW 4.20.046(1) (emphasis added). By its language, the general survival statute adopts the "two-tier" system of beneficiaries featured in the wrongful death statute for noneconomic damages.
¶ 16 But the statute's plain language does not preclude David's estate from recovering purely economic damages despite the fact that Earl is not a statutory beneficiary. Accordingly, we agree that the superior court erred when it dismissed Earl's claim for economic damages.
¶ 17 In Wilson v. Grant, Division Three of this court concluded that nothing in the general survival statute's history demonstrated that the legislature intended to limit the traditional recovery of economic damages only to those who qualified as statutory beneficiaries under RCW 4.20.020. 162 Wn.App. 731, 741-42, 258 P.3d 689 (2011); see also Cavazos v. Franklin, 73 Wn.App. 116, 121, 867 P.2d 674 (1994) (holding that under the general survival statute, the decedent's administrator is entitled to maintain an action for the following damages: disability with its attendant permanent loss of earning power, burial and funeral expenses, medical and hospital expenses, and general damages to the decedent's estate).
¶ 18 The Wilson court also scrutinized a 1993 amendment to the general survival statute, which amendment added the language giving rise to statutory beneficiaries' right to recover noneconomic damages (such as pain and suffering). 162 Wash.App. at 741, 258 P.3d 689. The court concluded that the amendment was intended to address only concerns that noneconomic damages were available to statutory beneficiaries under the "special survival statute" (RCW 4.20.060), while the same damages were simultaneously unavailable under the general survival statute. Wilson, 162 Wash.App. at 741, 258 P.3d 689.
¶ 19 Aacres contends that Division One of this court reached the opposite conclusion in Cummings v. Guardianship Services of Seattle, 128 Wn.App. 742, 110 P.3d 796 (2005), review denied, 157 Wn.2d 1006, 136 P.3d 759 (2006). But that case is distinguishable because the court in Cummings interpreted a former provision of the AVAA that it deemed controlling instead of the general survival statute. 128 Wash.App. at 752, 110 P.3d 796. There, the court held that no economic damages were recoverable because an AVAA provision restricted the right to seek all damages except damages for the benefit of the statutory beneficiaries "`set forth in chapter 4.20 RCW'" and Cummings had no qualifying beneficiaries. Cummings, 128 Wash.App. at 752, 110 P.3d 796 (emphasis omitted) (quoting RCW 74.34.210). Furthermore, the legislature later amended the dispositive provision in Cummings with language unequivocally permitting recovery of economic damages in the absence of statutory beneficiaries.
¶ 20 Additionally, Aacres relies on dicta from Philippides in support of its argument. The Philippides court made the broad statement that "Washington's four interrelated statutory causes of action for wrongful death and survival each require that parents be `dependent for support' on a deceased adult child in order to recover. See RCW 4.24.010 (child injury/death); RCW 4.20.020 (wrongful death); RCW 4.20.046 (general survival statute); RCW 4.20.060. (special survival statute)." 151 Wash.2d at 386, 88 P.3d 939. This is true, but only to the extent a party is seeking to recover for noneconomic damages. The Wilson court also considered this statement and concluded that it was not meant to preclude an award of economic damages.
¶ 21 Accordingly, although the general survival statute allows only those who qualify as beneficiaries to pursue claims for certain enumerated damages, it does not exclude all other damages historically available. Therefore, we follow Wilson and hold that economic damages, including funeral costs are available to David's estate under the general survival statute.
¶ 22 Earl contends that prohibiting David's recovery of noneconomic damages violates David's constitutional right of access to the courts under both Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, and article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution. As a threshold matter, Earl did not present this to the superior court. But a party may raise a manifest error affecting a constitutional right for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a)(3).
¶ 23 The United States Supreme Court has held that Title II of the ADA is constitutionally valid and that access to the courts is a fundamental right. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004). Title II of the ADA provides, "[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Additionally, our Supreme Court has held that access to the civil justice system is founded upon our constitution which mandates that "[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10; Lowy v. PeaceHealth, 174 Wn.2d 769, 776, 280 P.3d 1078 (2012).
¶ 24 Here, Earl argues that, absent beneficiaries, recovery under the wrongful death statute would be limited to David's "net accumulations."
¶ 25 Such a holding is consistent with the principle that Washington's wrongful death statutes create causes of action only for specific surviving beneficiaries of the deceased and which only begin at the death of the decedent. Otani, 151 Wash.2d at 755, 92 P.3d 192. Accordingly, as the Triplett court concluded, RCW 4.20.020 does not violate David's constitutional rights to access the courts post-mortem. Therefore, we follow Triplett to hold that David was not denied access to the courts in violation of his constitutional rights.
¶ 26 Finally, Earl asserts that David should be considered a minor under Washington law because of his cognitive disabilities.
¶ 27 We reverse the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Aacres on the issue of economic damages and remand for a determination of David's funeral expenses. We decline to recognize a common law wrongful death cause of action that would conflict with the existing statutory framework and, therefore, we affirm the superior court's order granting summary judgment on the noneconomic damages claim. We hold further that the wrongful death statute does not unconstitutionally deny David access to the courts.
We concur: HUNT and BJORGEN, JJ.
(Emphasis added.) Neither party argues that amended RCW 74.34.210 applies.
To the extent that Earl wishes to make a similar argument, he cannot show, as he must, that there is no reasonable ground to distinguish between the tiers of beneficiaries. The legislature has ostensibly determined that the degree to which a spouse or child typically depends on a decedent is sufficiently different from that which a parent or sibling does. A child would frequently be able to establish dependence on a parent, but the inverse is likely rare. The same can be said in comparing spouses with siblings. The Philippides court rejected a similar argument based on the privileges and immunities clause. 151 Wash.2d at 392-93, 88 P.3d 939. There, the court concluded that there was no violation of the privileges and immunities clause because legitimate differences between classes provided a reasonable basis to treat them differently. Philippides, 151 Wash.2d at 393, 88 P.3d 939.
